Cybersecurity

Catching Active Directory Attacks Early: Kerberoasting, DCSync and Lateral Movement Detection

Marta Teknoloji•November 4, 2026•9 min read

Why attackers set their sights on Active Directory

In corporate networks, Active Directory (AD) decides who can access which resource. That makes it the most valuable target for an attacker: whoever obtains domain admin rights can reach file servers, databases, backups and almost every computer. In many ransomware incidents, an AD takeover happens before any encryption begins.

The good news is that this rarely happens in one step. The attacker reconnoitres, harvests credentials, moves from machine to machine and finally reaches a domain controller. Every step leaves a trace. An organisation that spots those traces in time has a real chance of stopping the attack before encryption starts.

Credential attacks

Kerberoasting

In Active Directory, any domain user can request a Kerberos service ticket for a service account. Part of that ticket is encrypted with a key derived from the service account's password. The attacker takes the ticket and tries to guess the password offline, on their own machine, away from the network. Service accounts with weak passwords that have not changed in years, and which are often highly privileged, are the easiest targets.

AS-REP Roasting

For accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled, an attacker can obtain an encrypted response without knowing the password, and again attempt offline password guessing against it. Pre-authentication is usually switched off for some legacy application and then forgotten.

DCSync and DCShadow

DCSync abuses the legitimate replication mechanism between domain controllers. An account holding the necessary replication rights can pose as a domain controller and request users' password hashes, including that of the krbtgt account. In practice, that means the domain has been taken over. DCShadow works the other way round: it impersonates a rogue controller in order to push changes into AD.

Credential dumping

Pulling credentials from LSASS memory, the SAM database or the NTDS database on a domain controller is what fuels lateral movement. These attempts are usually made with well-known tools or their derivatives.

Direct attacks on domain controllers

Some vulnerabilities spare the attacker a long journey:

  • Zerologon: a flaw in the Netlogon protocol can lead to the takeover of an unpatched domain controller's machine account.
  • PetitPotam: coerces a server into authenticating to a system the attacker controls; under the right conditions this can extend to domain-level privileges via certificate services.
  • PrintNightmare: a vulnerability in the print spooler service that can be used for remote code execution and privilege escalation.

Patches exist for all of these. But patch status is rarely uniform across every server, and an exploitation attempt is a valuable sign that an attacker is inside, even in a fully patched environment.

Lateral movement: once they are in

Initial access usually comes through an ordinary user's computer: a phishing email, a document with macros or a leaked password. To reach their objective, the attacker has to move from machine to machine. The most common methods are:

  • PsExec-style remote services: a tool copied over admin shares and run as a service on the remote machine,
  • WMI, WinRM and DCOM: remote commands through Windows' built-in management stack,
  • Remote scheduled tasks: code executed by creating a task on another machine,
  • Internal RDP: remote desktop connections to servers with compromised accounts,
  • Pass-the-Hash: authenticating with a stolen password hash rather than the password itself,
  • SSH on Linux: internal root logons, password spraying and new keys added to the authorised keys list.

Most of these methods use the same legitimate tools IT teams rely on every day. Looked at as single events they can seem harmless; the real picture only emerges in context.

Why one machine is not enough: fleet-wide correlation

An administrator connecting to a server over remote desktop is routine. The same account logging on to dozens of machines in a short space of time is not. Likewise, an admin account logging on for the first time to a machine it has never touched, or a hop from a machine that has just raised an alert to other machines, will not stand out in any single machine's log.

Detecting lateral movement therefore means evaluating events from every endpoint together. An alert on one machine and an unusual logon on another a few minutes later look like noise in isolation; together, they are an attack chain.

Early warning signs along the attack chain

Attack stageExample techniqueSign to watch for
ReconnaissanceAD enumeration toolsBulk AD discovery from an ordinary client
Credential accessKerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, LSASS dumpingUnusual ticket requests, access to LSASS memory
Privilege escalationAdding members to privileged groupsUnexpected changes to groups such as Domain Admins
Lateral movementPsExec-style services, WMI/WinRM, Pass-the-HashNew service installs, one account logging on to many machines
Domain takeoverDCSync, ZerologonReplication requests from something that is not a domain controller
Covering tracksLog clearing, audit policy changesSecurity log cleared

The last row deserves emphasis: legitimate administrators very rarely clear the security log. A cleared log or a changed audit policy is, on its own, an event that needs urgent attention.

Shrink the attack surface first

However good your detection is, closing the doors that can be closed is always cheaper. Common risks in AD environments include:

  • Kerberoastable service accounts with weak passwords and high privileges; move to group managed service accounts (gMSA) where possible,
  • Accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled,
  • Servers configured for unconstrained delegation,
  • Accounts that hold replication (DCSync) rights without being domain controllers,
  • A krbtgt password that has not been changed for a long time, never-expiring passwords and stale accounts,
  • Legacy protocols such as NTLM and LLMNR/NBT-NS left enabled, and SMB signing not enforced.

Active Directory security with Marta Security SAM

Marta Security SAM (Cyber Analysis Centre Management Software) is a threat detection and threat notification system developed by Marta Teknoloji. Its agent, installed on domain controllers, member servers and workstations, evaluates Windows security events, Kerberos and directory service events, Deep Monitoring telemetry and Sigma-based Threat Hunt together.

Here is how the techniques covered in this article map to Marta Security SAM:

  • Credential attacks: Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting and DCSync detection; LSASS, SAM and NTDS credential dumping, LSASS memory access and Mimikatz detection.
  • Domain controller attacks: Zerologon, PetitPotam, PrintNightmare and DCShadow.
  • Lateral movement: PsExec-style remote services, tool transfer over admin shares, remote commands via WMI/WinRM/DCOM, remote scheduled tasks, internal RDP, Pass-the-Hash and SSH lateral movement on Linux.
  • Fleet-wide correlation: one account logging on to many machines quickly, pivoting from an alerting machine, and first-time admin logons.
  • Privilege and anti-forensics: members added to or removed from privileged groups, password resets on other users' accounts, security logs cleared and audit policy changes; AD reconnaissance with BloodHound/AdFind.

Every detection is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK; high and critical alerts are sent by email, SMS, Teams, Slack or webhook and tracked as cases. On the prevention side, the AD attack surface audit reports Kerberoastable and AS-REP-roastable accounts, unconstrained delegation, DCSync rights, AdminSDHolder, sIDHistory and trusts. Hardening cards for NTLM, LLMNR/NBT-NS, SMB signing, LSA protection, Credential Guard and more save the previous values when applied and can be rolled back in one click.

For the full list of modules, visit the Marta Security SAM product page. If you would like to review the attack surface of your Active Directory environment together, contact us.

#Active Directory#Kerberoasting#DCSync#yanal hareket#Zerologon#tehdit tespiti#Marta Security SAM

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